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ABSTRACT
SOME RESULTS ON MONOTONICITY
DI˙NDAR, Hayrullah
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
September 2010
In this thesis, we investigate several issues concerning social choice rules which
satisfy different degrees of Maskin type monotonicities. Firstly, we introduce
g−monotonicity and monotonicity region notions which enable one to com-
pare monotonicity properties of non Maskin monotonic social choice rules. We
compare self-monotonicities of standard scoring rules and study monotonicity
of Majoritarian compromise. Secondly we determine domains of impossibil-
ity and possibility when the individual preferences are clustered around two
opposing norms and the degree of clustering is measured via the Manhattan
metric. In the last chapter we investigate the relation between monotonicity
and dictatoriality when agents are allowed to have thick indifference classes.
Keywords:Monotonicity, Self monotonicity, Manhattan metric, Impossibility,
Majoritarian compromise, Standard scoring rules.
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O¨ZET
TEKDU¨ZELI˙K U¨ZERI˙NE BAZI SONUC¸LAR
DI˙NDAR, Hayrullah
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Eylu¨l 2010
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda, c¸es¸itli Maskin tarzı tekdu¨zelikleri sag˜layan sosyal sec¸me
kurallarının o¨zelliklerini inceliyoruz. I˙lk olarak, Maskin tekdu¨ze olmayan
sosyal sec¸me kurallarının tekdu¨zeliklerini kıyaslamamıza imkan sag˜layan g-
tekdu¨zelik ve tekdu¨zelik bo¨lgesi kavramlarını tanımlıyoruz. Standart puanla-
malı kuralların o¨z tekdu¨zeliklerini kars¸ılas¸tırıp, C¸og˜unlukc¸u uzlas¸ı’nın tekdu¨zelig˜ini
inceliyoruz. I˙kinci olarak, kis¸isel tercihlerin birbirine zıt iki normun etrafnda
Manhattan metrig˜ine go¨re yıg˜ıs¸tıg˜ı tanım bo¨lgelerinin imkansızlık bo¨lgeleri
olup olmadıg˜ını belirliyoruz. Tezin son kısmında, tek elemanlı olmayan es¸deg˜erlik
sınıflarına izin verildig˜i durumda, tekdu¨zelik ve diktato¨rlu¨k arasındaki ilis¸kiyi
inceliyoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tekdu¨zelik, O¨z tekdu¨zelik, Manhattan metrig˜i, I˙mkansızlık,
C¸og˜unlukc¸u uzlas¸ı, Standart puanlamalı kurallar.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, we deal with several issues concerning social choice rules
which satisfy different degrees of monotonicities . In particular, we extend
”Maskin-type” monotonicities to all social choice rules, whether Maskin-
monotonic or not. The conepts of g−monotonicity and monotonicity region
enable us to compare the monotonicity properties of non-Maskin-monotonic
social choice rules. These notions are motivated by their counterparts for
Maskin monotonic SCRs, namely h − monotonicity and center, introduced
by Koray(2002).
To further classify Maskin-monotonic SCRs according to their degrees of
monotonicity. The notion of strongest monotonicities that a SCR satisfies,
called self-monotonicities, was used by Koray and Pasin (2005) to investi-
gate the role that self-monotonicities of a solution concept σ plays in a σ-
implementabilty.
The notion of center extensively used in (Koray and Dog˜an(2008) ) arises
naturally from the idea of a critical profile first introduced in Koray,Adali,Erol
and Ordulu (2001). The center of a Maskin-monotonic SCR F is roughly a
minimal subregion of its domain such that what F does on this subdomain
uniquely determines what it does on entire on the entire domain. Erol (2009)
further investigated properties of center.
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Dually, given a non-Maskin-monotonic SCR F , its monotonicity region
refers to a maximal subregion of its domain which is ”closed under monotonic
transformations” and on which F is Maskin-monotonic.
Koray and Dog˜an (2007) classify Maskin-monotonic SCRs according to
their degrees of monotonicty, employing the notion of self − monotonicity
that specifies, the strongest h−monotonicities of a given SCR. They also em-
ploy the notion of self−monotonicity to establish newNash−implementability
for the two-agent case.
In the same spirit, we define self − g − monotonicity for non-Maskin-
monotonic SCRs and use it to compare the degrees of monotonicities of a
subset of scoring rules. For non-Maskin-monotonic SCRs, we establish the
relation between self − g − monotonicity and monotonicity region . We
also generalize some of the results from Koray and Dogan(2007) for scoring
rules. Monotonicity properties of the Majoritarian Compromise , introduced
by Murat Sertel, are also examined.
Kaya and Koray (2000) provide the first paper that relates the mono-
tonicites of a game-theoretic solution concept σ to the set of σ-implementable
SCRs, and characterize the solution concepts which implement only Maskin-
monotonic SCRs. The notion of monotonicity they introduce for solution
concepts is a natural modification of Maskin-monotonicty for SCRs.
Koray and Pasin (2005) introduce H − monotonicity as the counter-
part of h − monotonicity for solution concepts. They find the unique self-
monotonicity of the Nash equilibrium concept and show that it is inherited via
the mechanism employed by the implemented SCRs. If one empleys Maskin-
Vind type mechanisms, the inherited monotonicity is naturally nothing but
”essential monotonicity”. Pasin(2009) also give a new characterization of
strong Nash implementability via critical profiles.
Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for Nash implementabil-
ity (and strong Nash implementability ) due to Maskin(1977). There are
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several game-theoretic solution concepts which themselves are not ”Maskin-
monotonic” and thus also implement some non-Maskin-monotonic SCRs.
The notion of G − monotonicity introduced here shares the same spirit as
H−monotonicity for solution concepts. We conjecture that in the context of
non-Maskin-monotonic solution concepts, G-monotonicity will play a similar
role as H − monotonicty does with implementabilty according to Maskin-
monotonic solution concepts.
The well-known Mueller-Satterthwaite Theorem states that a social choice
function defined on the set of all linear order profiles is onto and Maskin
monotonic if and only if it is dictatorial under the presence of at least three
alternatives.
A common way of escaping the impossibility results in social choice theory
is to relax the full domain assumption and allow the society to choose from
only a subset of preference profiles.
For a finite set A of alternatives, and a finite set N of agents, letting L(A)
denote the set of linear orders on A. We refer to a subset D of L(A), as
a domain of impossibility if a social choice function F : DN → A is onto
and Maskin monotonic if and only if it is dictatorial under the presence of
at least three alternatives. On the other hand, a domain of possibility is a
subset D′ of L(A), such that there exists a non-dictatorial SCF F : D′N → A
which is onto and Maskin monotonic.
Among the domains of linear orders which are r-balls with respect to the
Manhattan metric about a center -a linear order representing a ”social norm”-
Koray,Kavlakolu and Gurer(2008) prove that a domain is one of impossibility
if and only if its radius larger than |A|.
Erol (2009) extended the Manhattan metric which counts the minimal
number of transpositions to obtain a linear order from a given one, assigning
equal weight to each transposition; by allowing different weights for trans-
positions at different levels. His result is interesting because he thereby also
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finds nested domains of impossibility and possibility.
A natural question that had been asked during this analysis of a unipolar
society was how the results would be influenced by a bipolar one, whose
examples are not difficult to find either in history or in the present time.
We consider domains of preferences in L(A) consisting of two sections
clustered around two opposing norms, respectively. Our main result here is
that a domain equal to the union of two balls around the opposing norms is
a domain of impossibility if and only if sum of the radii of the balls is greater
or equal to |A| − 1.
In the last chapter we investigate how the Mueller-Satterthwaite Theorem
is affected when one replaces linear orders by complee preorders in represent-
ing individual preferences. This is not meant just as a techincal exercise, as
indifferences in individual preferences can hardly be denied in real life, Having
gone through this exercise, we also agree with Salvador Barbera, who noted
that “indifferences require attention and careful treatment and the transla-
tion of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents
may be indefferent among some alternatives is not allways a straightforward
exercise”. (Barbera 2007)
We first note that there exists no SCF defined on the set C(A)N of com-
plete pre-order profiles, which satisfies both on the Maskin monotonicity
and unanimity. Intuitively the main reason that leads to this result is that
Maskin monotonicity requires that an alternative a chosen at R, continues
to get chosen at R′, even if R′ is obtained from R by moving all the strictly
worse alternatives to the same indifference class with a. To deal with this
problem we weaken Maskin monotonicity and work with this modified mono-
tonicty. We define three kinds of dictatoriality for SCFs defined on C(A)N
and investigate the relation between these dictatorialities and monotonicity.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
LetN = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set of individuals and letA = {a1, a2, · · · , am}
be a finite set of alternatives. We will assume m ≥ 3 throughout the paper.
The opinion of agent i, over the set A of alternatives is described by
a preference relation. L(A) denotes the set of linear orders over A (i.e.
complete, transitive, anti-symmetric binary relations. C(A) denotes the set
of complete pre-orders over A (i.e. dropping the anti-symmetry assumption
thus allow for indifference).
A preference profile P ∈ L(A)N (R ∈ C(A)N) is the data for each agent
of a linear order (complete pre-order ) on A. Given Ri ∈ C(A) , strict and
indifference parts of Ri ∈ C(A) will be denoted by Pi and Ii respectively.
L(A)N (C(A)N) is the set of all possible preference profiles for given A and
N .
Given a subset, D, of L(A) or C(A) a social choice rule F is a nonempty
correspondence from the set DN of preference profiles into the set A of alter-
natives F : DN → A. A social choice function is a single-valued social choice
rule.
Definition. For any given alternative a, any agent i and any preference
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profile R ∈ C(A)N the lower contour set of a w.r.t. R for agent i is :
Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aRib)}
and the strict lower contour set of a w.r.t. R for agent i is :
L∗i (a,R) = {b ∈ A|aPib}
Given an alternative a ∈ A and a preference profile R ∈ L(A)N , MT (a,R)
denotes the set of preference profiles such that for any agent the lower contour
set of a does not shrink, i.e. MT (a,R) = {R′ ∈ L(A)N |∀i ∈ N ;Li(a,R) ⊂
Li(a,R
′)}.
Definition. Let D ⊂ C(A), an SCR F : DN → A is Maskin monotonic if
and only if ∀R,R′ ∈ DN and ∀a ∈ A
[a ∈ F (R) and R′ ∈MT (a,R)]⇒ a ∈ F (R′).
Given an alternative a ∈ A, an agent i ∈ N and a preference profile
R ∈ L(A); ri(a,R) denotes the rank of a for i at R,i.e. ri(a,R) = |{b ∈
A|bRia}|. We will write r(a,Ri) instead of ri(a,R) when we are working
with a preference rather than a preference profile. Given an agent i ∈ N ,k ∈
{1, · · · ,m} and a preference profile R ∈ L(A); σ(i, k, R) denotes the k’th best
alternative according to i,i.e. a = σ(i, k, R)⇒ ri(a,R) = k.
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CHAPTER 3
MONOTONICITY PROPERTIES OF
NON MASKIN MONOTONIC
SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
In this chapter we study the monotonicity properties of nonMaskin monotonic
social choice rules using g −monotonicity and monotonicity region notions;
counterparts of h − monotonicity and center concepts . To make it easier
for the reader to see the similarities between the two concepts, this chapter
contains some of the old results, as well as some minor new results about
h−monotonicity.1
Let F : L(A)N → A be an SCR , F satisfies unanimity if and only if
for any alternative a ∈ A and any preference profile R ∈ L(A)N s.t. a is top
ranked by all agents, a is among the chosen alternatives by F at R, i.e. ∀a ∈ A
∀R ∈ L(A)N [∀i ∈ N ri(a,R) = 1] ⇒ a ∈ F (R). Let Γ denote the set of
all unanimous SCRs and M denote the set of all unanimous and Maskin−
monotonic SCRs. Let F ∈ Γ, define GrF = {(a,R) ∈ A×L(A)N |a ∈ F (R)}.
Throughout this chapter unanimity will be assumed and the reason will
be clear once we define g −monotonicity.
Definition. Given F ∈ Γ let h : GrF → (2A)N and g : GrF → (2A)N
1Koray(2002), Koray, Pasin(2005) Dogan (2007) contains a more detailed treatment of
h−monotonicity and center.
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be two functions. We say that F is h − monotonic if and only if for any
R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and any a ∈ F (R),
[∀i ∈ N Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R)]⇒ a ∈ F (R′)
Similarly we say that F is g−monotonic if and only if for any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N
and any a ∈ F (R),
[∀i ∈ N Li(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R)]⇒ a ∈ F (R′)
h : GrF → (2A)N is a self − h − monotonicity of F if and only if F is
h−monotonic and there is no h′ : GrF → (2A)N with h′ ( h such that F is
h′ −monotonic.
Similarly g : GrF → (2A)N is a self − g −monotonicity of F if and only
if F is g−monotonic and there is no g′ : GrF → (2A)N with g′ ( g such that
F is g′ −monotonic.
Proposition 1. Let F be an SCR such that for any alternative a ∈ A there
exists a preference profile R ∈ L(A)N with a ∈ F (R),i.e. F is onto.
F satisfies unanimity if and only if there exists a function g : GrF → (2A)N
such that F is g −monotonic.
Proof. Assume F satisfies unanimity. Since for any a ∈ A and for any
R ∈ L(A)N , [∀i ∈ N r(a,Ri) = 1] implies a ∈ F (R); g : GrF → (2A)N
defined as gi(R, a) = (A,A, ..., A) ∀i ∈ N is a g −monotonicity of F .
Assume there exists a function g : GrF → (2A)N such that F is g −
monotonic. Now g : GrF → (2A)N defined as gi(R, a) = (A,A, ..., A) ∀i ∈ N
is also a g −monotonicity of F . Now for any a ∈ A and for any R ∈ L(A)N
, [∀i ∈ N Li(a,R) = A] implies a ∈ F (R) since F is onto. Thus F satisfies
unanimity.
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Remark 1. 1) If L(a,R) ⊂ h(a,R) for each (R, a) ∈ GrF , h−monotonicity
is nothing but Maskin−monotonicity. Thus ∀F ∈ Γ \M; F does not have
any h−monotonicity.
2) If g(R, a) ⊂ L(a,R) for each (R, a) ∈ GrF , g−monotonicity is nothing
but Maskin−monotonicity. Thus ∀F ∈M; ∀(a,R) ∈ GrF and for any agent
i ∈ N gi(a,R) = (∅, ∅, ..., ∅) is the unique self − g −monotonicity of F .
3) h−monotonicity ⇒Maskin−monotonicity ⇒ g −monotonicity
4) Note that, if h is a self −h−monotonicity of F , then for any (a,R) ∈
GrF and any i ∈ N hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R).
Definition. Let F,G ∈ Γ . We say that F satisfies a stronger h−monotonicity
condition than G if and only if
GrG ⊂ GrF and there exist self − h −monotonicities hF and hG of F
and G , respectively s.t. for any (a,R) ∈ GrG, we have hF (a,R) ⊂ hG(a,R).
Let GrG = {(a,R) ∈ GrG | ∀R′ ∈ L(A)N [∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)]
implies a ∈ G(R′)} . We say that F satisfies a stronger g −monotonicity
condition than G if and only if
GrG ⊂ GrF and there exist self−g−monotonicities gF and gG of F and
G, respectively ,s.t. for any (a,R) ∈ GrG∩GrF we have gF (a,R) ⊂ gG(a,R).
Remark 2. For the case F,G ∈M, g−monotonicity is not very telling , since
it boils down to GrG ⊂ GrF .
Similarly if F,G ∈ Γ \M, h −monotonicity is not very telling since neither
F nor G has any h−monotonicity.
Given a ∈ A, ρ(a) denotes the following partition of L(A)N induced by a
ρ(a) = {{R′ ∈ L(A)N |∀i ∈ N : Li(a,R) = Li(a,R′)|R ∈ L(A)N}}
Given R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and an alternative a, we say that R′ is a refinement
of R w.r.t. a if R ∈ MT (R′). We say that R′ is a strict refinement if the
inclusion (of lower contour sets) is strict for at least one agent.
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Definition. Let R ∈ L(A)N and F ∈ Γ. We say that R is an a-monotonicity
profile for an alternative a ∈ A relative to F if and only if
a ∈ F (R) and ∀R′ ∈∈ MT (a,R) we have a ∈ F (R′). In which case we say
that F is locally monotonic at (a,R).
Given an alternative a, we will denote the set of a-monotonicity profiles for
a relative to F by Ma(F ), i.e.
Ma(F ) = {R ∈ L(A)N |a ∈ F (R) and ∀R′ ∈MT (a,R) : a ∈ F (R′)}
Let F ∈ Γ and S1, ..., Sk be distinct members of ρ(a) s.t.
⋃
i∈{1,...,k} Si =
Ma(F ). We will refer to a set R1, ..., Rk s.t. Ri ∈ Si for each i ∈ {1, ..., k}
as an a − monotonicity region of F . Let for each a ∈ A, MRa(F ) be an
a−monotonicity region of F .
Remark 3. 1)Let a ∈ A and F ∈ Γ. Note that MRa(F ) 6= ∅ since
∅ 6= {R ∈ L(A)N | ∀i ∈ N Li(a,R) = A} ⊂MRa(F ) .
2) If F ∈M , MRa(F ) = {R ∈ L(A)N | a ∈ F (R)}.
Definition. A profile R ∈ L(A)N is an a − critical profile for some a ∈ A
relative to an SCR F ∈M if a ∈ F (R) and for any strict refinement R′ of R
w.r.t. a, we have a /∈ F (R′). We will denote the set of a − critical profiles
relative to F by Ca(F ).
Let F ∈ M and S1, ..., Sk be distinct members of ρ(a) s.t.
⋃
i∈{1,...,k} Si =
Ca(F ). We will refer to a set R1, ..., Rk s.t. Ri ∈ Si for each i ∈ {1, ..., k} as
an a− center of F . Let for each a ∈ A, CEa(F ) be an a-center of F . We will
refer to a set
⋃
a∈ACEa(F ) as a center of F .
Proposition 2. Let a ∈ A, R ∈ L(A)N and F ∈ Γ. R ∈ Ma(F ) if and only
if for any self − g −monotonicity of F ; gFi (a,R) = ∅ ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Obvious
Proposition 3. Let F,G ∈ Γ. F satisfies a stronger g −monotonicity con-
dition than G if and only if ∀a ∈ A Ma(G) ⊂Ma(F ).
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Proof. Assume F satisfies a stronger g−monotonicity condition than G. Let
a ∈ A and R ∈Ma(G).
Note that GrG =
⋃
a∈AMa(G). Now GrG ⊂ Gr(F ) implies (a,R) ∈ GrF .
Since (a,R) ∈ GrG we have (a,R) ∈ GrG ∩GrF .
R ∈ Ma(G) implies gG(a,R) = (∅, ∅, ..., ∅) for any self − g −monotonicity
of G. Since F satisfies a stronger g −monotonicity condition than G , there
exist a self − g − monotonicity of F , say gF , s.t. gF (a,R) = (∅, ∅, ..., ∅).
Thus R ∈Ma(F ).
Assume ∀a ∈ A Ma(G) ⊂Ma(F ).
Note that GrG =
⋃
a∈AMa(G) ⊂
⋃
a∈AMa(F ) ⊂ GrF .
Let a ∈ A and R ∈ L(A)N s.t. a ∈ F (R) ∩G(R), and let gG be a self − g −
monotonicity of G.
Note that ∀R′ ∈ L(A)N
[∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ∪ gGi (a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)]⇒ a ∈ G(R′)
Now R′ ∈Ma(G) since ∀R′′ ∈ L(A)N
[∀i ∈ NLi(a,R′) ⊂ Li(a,R′′)]
⇔ [∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ∪ gGi (a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′′)]
⇒ a ∈ G(R′)
Now R′ ∈Ma(G) which implies ∀R′′ ∈ L(A)N
[∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ∪ gGi (a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′′)]⇒ a ∈ G(R′)
Define g : GrF → (2A)N as follows:
∀(a,R) ∈ GrG ∩GrF g(a,R) = gG(R, a)
and ∀(a,R) ∈ GrF \GrG g(a,R) = A
Note that g defined as above is a g − monotonicity of F and there exists
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gF ⊂ g s.t. gF is a self − g −monotonicity of F , now
∀(a,R) ∈ GrG ∩GrF gF (a,R) ⊂ g(a,R) ⊂ gG(a,R)
The next proposition , which we borrow from Koray,Dogan(2008) will be
used in the next section.
Proposition 4. Let F,G ∈ M. F satisfies a stronger h − monotonicity
condition than G if and only if for any a ∈ A, R ∈ Ca(G) there exists some
R′ ∈ Ca(F ) s.t. R′ is a refinement of R w.r.t. a.
3.1 Standard Scoring Rules
Throughout this section m,n ≥ 3 will be assumed.
A score vector is an m-tuple v = (v1, v2, ..., vm) ∈ Rm with vi ≥ vi+1 for all
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m− 1} and v1 > vm.
We say that a social choice rule F is a scoring rule induced by a score vector
v ∈ Rm if and only if for any R ∈ L(A)N we have,
F (R) = {a ∈ A |
∑
i∈N
vri(a,R) ≥
∑
i∈N
vri(b,R) ∀b ∈ A}
Remark 4. 1) Any scoring rule satisfies unanimity thus any scoring rule
satisfies a g −monotonicity.
For sake of simplifying the notation we will assume v ∈ [0, 1]m , v1 = 1
and vm = 0 and the following proposition shows that this does not affect the
generality of the results.
Proposition 5. Let F be a scoring rule induced by a scoring vector v ∈ Rm
. If G is a scoring rule induced by a scoring vector w ∈ Rm where w =
(v1−vm
v1−vm ,
v2−vm
v1−vm , ...,
vm−vm
v1−vm ) , G = F .
Proof. Note that v1−vm > 0 so w is a well defined vector in Rm and wi ≥ wi+1
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m−1} and w1 > wm follows directly from v being a scoring
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vector. Finally ∀R ∈ L(A)N ∀a, b ∈ A
∑
i∈N
vri(a,R) ≥
∑
i∈N
vri(b,R) ⇔
∑
i∈N
wri(a,R) ≥
∑
i∈N
wri(b,R)
Thus G(R) = F (R).
Proposition 6. Let F be a scoring rule with score vector v and let g : GrF →
(2A)N be a function.
F is g −monotonic if and only if
∀(a,R) ∈ GrF and ∀b ∈ A \ {a}
∑
i∈Nba
(1− vm−ci) ≤
∑
i∈Nab
minj∈{1,...,m−ci}(vj − vj+1) (3.1)
where Nab = {i ∈ N |b ∈ Li(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R)}, N ba = N \ Nab and ci =
|Li(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R)| − 1.
Proof. Assume F is g −monotonic, let (a,R) ∈ GrF and b ∈ A \ {a}. Con-
sider the preference profile R′ with ∀i ∈ N Li(a,R′) = Li(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R).
Note that ∀i ∈ N ri(a,R) = ci. Now consider the profile R′′ obtained R′ as
follows:
For all agents i that ranks b above a at R′, interchange b with the top ranked
alternative, leaving everything else the same,i.e. ∀i ∈ N s.t. bR′ia: ri(b, R′′) =
1 ,ri(σ(i, 1, R
′), R′′) = ri(b, R′ , ∀c ∈ A \ {b, σ(i, 1, R′)} ri(c, R′′) = ri(c, R′′)
For all agents i that ranks a above b at R′,move b just belove a and move
a, b as a block
a
b
to an upper position so that the difference of score gain
between a and b is minimal,i.e.
∀i ∈ N s.t. aR′ib: R′′ ∈ S and ∀Rx ∈ S vr(a,R′′) − vr(a,R′′)+1 ≤ vr(a,Rx) −
vr(a,Rx)+1 where S = {Rx ∈ L(A) | [L(a,R′i) ⊂ L(a,Rx)] r(b, Rx) =
r(a,Rx) + 1}
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Note that
[∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′′)]
thus g −monotonicity of F implies a ∈ F (R′′), i.e.
∑
{i∈N |bR′′i a}
1 +
∑
{i∈N |aR′′i b}
vr(b,R′′i ) ≤
∑
{i∈N |bR′′i a}
vm−ci +
∑
{i∈N |aR′′i b}
vr(a,R′′i )
now , it easy to see that equation 1 is satisfied by construction of R′′. Since
for any b ∈ A \ {a} there exists such R′′ we are done.
For the converse , let g : GrF → (2A)N be a function s.t.
∀(a,R) ∈ GrF and ∀b ∈ A \ {a} equation 1 holds. Let R′ be a preference
profile s.t. [∀i ∈ NLi(a,R)∪ gi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)], and b ∈ A\{a}. Note that
equation 1 implies total score of b is less than total score of a at R′′
∑
{i∈N |bR′′i a}
1 +
∑
{i∈N |aR′′i b}
vr(b,R′′i ) ≤
∑
{i∈N |bR′′i a}
vm−ci +
∑
{i∈N |aR′′i b}
vr(a,R′′i )
where R′′ is defined in the first part of the proof. By construction of we
have total score of b is less than total score of a at R′′. Now using the same
procedure for every alternative other than a, we get total score of b is less
than total score of a at R′ for any b ∈ A \ a,i.e. a ∈ F (R′) . Since R′ is an
arbitrary preference profile s.t. [∀i ∈ NLi(a,R) ∪ gi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)] F is
g −monotonic.
Corollary. Let F be a scoring rule with score vector v.
F is Maskin−monotonic if and only if
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∀(a,R) ∈ GrF and ∀b ∈ A \ {a}
∑
i∈Nba
(1− vm−ci) ≤
∑
i∈Nab
minj∈{1,...,m−ci}(vj − vj+1)
where Nab = {i ∈ N |b ∈ Li(a,R)}, N ba = N \Nab and ci = |Li(a,R)| − 1.
Proof. Note that a SCR is Maskin monotonic if and only if it is g−monotonic
for g(a,R) = (∅, ..., ∅) ∀(a,R) ∈ GrF . Applying the previous proposition we
get the desired result.
Proposition 7. Let F be a scoring rule with score vector v and let h : GrF →
(2A)N be a function.
F is h−monotonic if and only if
∀(a,R) ∈ GrF and ∀b ∈ A \ {a}
∑
i∈Nba
(1− vm−ci) ≤
∑
i∈Nab
minj∈{1,...,m−ci}(vj − vj+1) (3.2)
where Nab = {i ∈ N |b ∈ Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R)}, N ba = N \ Nab and ci =
|Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R)| − 1.
Proof. Almost the same proof as the previous proposition.
The following theorem by Dog˜an (2008) characterizes theMaskin−monotonic
scoring rules.
Theorem 1. Let F be a scoring rule with score vector v and let k = min{i ∈
{1, 2, ...,m− 1}|vi+1 6= v1}.
F is Maskin-monotonic if and only if i or ii holds;
i) m = 3 , n = 4 and v1 > v2 = v3
ii) k > m(n−1)
n
.
Proposition 8. Let F and G be scoring rules with score vectors v and w
respectively. Let kF = min{i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m−1}|vi+1 6= v1} and kG = min{i ∈
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{1, 2, ...,m− 1}|wi+1 6= w1} .
If 2 ≤ kG ≤ kF ≤ m(n−1)
n
F satisfies a stronger g−monotonicity condition
than G.
Proof. Let a ∈ A and R ∈ Ma(G). Let N ba = {i ∈ |bRi} and Nab = N \ N ba
for any b ∈ A \ {a}. We have
∑
i∈Nba
(1− wri(a,R)) ≤
∑
i∈Nab
minj∈{1,...,ri(a,R)}(wj − wj+1)
.Note that 0 = w1−w2 = minj∈{1,...,ri(a,R)}(wj −wj+1)so (1−wri(a,R)) = 0⇒
wri(a,R) = 1⇒ vri(a,R) = 1 ∀i ∈ N ba. Since v is a scoring vector vj−vj+1 ≥ 0
∀j ∈ 1, 2, ...,m− 1 and
∑
i∈Nba
(1− vri(a,R)) ≤ 0 ≤
∑
i∈Nab
minj∈{1,...,ri(a,R)}(vj − vj+1)
thus R ∈ Ma(F ). Since a and R are arbitrary , Ma(G) ⊂ Ma(F ). By
proposition 4 , F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than G.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. Let F and G be scoring
rules with score vectors (1, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 0) respectively,i.e. 1-plurality and
2-plurality. Consider the preference profile
R =
a b b
c c c
b a a
note that R ∈Mb(F ) and R ∈Mc(G) but
F (R) = {b} and G(R) = {c} so F and G are not comparable in terms of
their g −monotonicities.
Proposition 9. Let F and G be scoring rules with score vectors v and w
respectively. Let kF = min{i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m−1}|vi+1 6= v1} and kG = min{i ∈
{1, 2, ...,m− 1}|wi+1 6= w1} .
If kF ≥ kG > m(n−1)
n
F satisfies a stronger h −monotonicity condition than
G.
16
Proof. Assume kF ≥ kG > m(n−1)
n
. Note that k > m(n−1)
n
⇒ kn > mn−m⇒
m > n(m − k) since n > 0. Note that for any profile R ∈ L(A)N , we must
have some a ∈ A with |{i ∈ N | ri(a,R) ≤ k}| = n, which is the total
number of participants.
So for any alternative a and any preference profile R , a ∈ F (R)⇔ |{i ∈
N | ri(a,R) ≤ kF}| = n and similarly a ∈ G(R) ⇔ |{i ∈ N | ri(a,R) ≤
kG}| = n. Note that kF ≥ kG ⇒ GrG ⊂ GrF .
Let a ∈ A and R ∈ Ca(G). Note that we have a ∈ F (R), if R is an a
critical profile we are done. If not by definition of an a-critical profile ∃R(1) ∈
s.t. a ∈ F (R(1)) and R(1) is a strict refinement of R w.r.t. a. If R(1) is also not
an a-critical profile there exists R(2) s.t. R(2) is a strict refinement of R(1) and
a ∈ F (R(2)). After we continue this way after at most finitely many steps,
we will reach R(t), t ∈ N, s.t. R(t) ∈ Ca(F ) . Note that R(t) is a refinement of
R thus by Proposition 5, F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than
G.
3.2 Majoritarian Compromise
Majoritarian Compromise SCR is introduced by Murat Sertel. It satisfies de-
sired properties such as Majoritarian-optimality while it is not Maskin mono-
tonic and violates Condorcet consistency and Condorcet Loser criterion. It
is subgame perfect implementable but not nash implementable.2 We will
borrow Sertel and Yılmaz’s formulation with slight modifications.
Every Ri ∈ L(A) determines a (ordinal) utility Π : A → {1, 2, ...,m}
representing Ri through Π(a) = |L(a,Ri)| at each a ∈ A
For each coalition K ⊂ N , at each RK = {Ri}i∈K ∈ L(A)K we also de-
fine a (ordinal) ”welfare” ΠK : A → {1, 2, ...,m} representing RK through
ΠK(a) = Min{Πi(a)|i ∈ K}| at each a ∈ A, where Πi is the utility represent-
2For proofs and further analysis of Majoritarian Compromise, interested reader is re-
ferred to Sertel, Yılmaz (1998).
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ing the preference Ri (i ∈ K).
We say that an alternative ’gains kth degree approval or support’ from a
coalitionK ⊂ N with (coalitional) preference profile RK ∈ L(A)K iff ΠK(a) ≥
m− k + 1.
A coalition K ⊂ N is called a majority (in N) iff |K| ≥ |N \ K|. For a
given integer n, dn
2
e denotes the smallest integer which is no less than n
2
,i.e.
dn
2
e =

n
2
, if n is even;
n+1
2
, if n is odd.
At any profile R ∈ L(A)N , we write Π = Max{ΠK(a)|K ∈ µ , a ∈ A}
for the highest majority welfare achievable (by suitable choice of a) at R, and
we define M(R) = {a ∈ A|Πi(a) = Π} as the set of alternatives giving this
majority welfare.
At any R ∈ L(A)N and a ∈ A define K(a,R) = {i ∈ N |Πi(a) ≥ Π} as
the set of agents enjoying at least Π utility at a.
Definition. The Majoritarian Compromise is the SCR M : L(A)N → A
defined by M(R) = {a ∈M(R)|b ∈M(R)⇒ |K(b, R)| ≤ |K(a,R)|}.
Specifically, given any set A of alternatives, for any profile R of strict
preferences (linear orders) on A, M picks that subset M(R) of the alternatives
inA which gain the largest number of agents’s k∗(R)th degree approvals, where
k∗(R), the critical degree of majority approval at R, is the smallest integer k
for which some alternative is commonly regarded as kth best or better by at
least half of the n agents whose preferences are recorded by the profile R.
Lemma 1. Let R ∈ L(A)N . There exists a ∈ A s.t. M is locally monotonic
at (a,R) ∈ GrM only if k∗(R) ≤ 2.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that k∗(R) ≥ 3.
Let a ∈ M(R), since k∗(R) ≥ 3 number of agents who rank a at second
rank or better is strictly less than dn
2
e ,i.e. |{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) ≤ k∗(R)− 1}| <
dn
2
e and there exists an agent who ranks a k∗(R)th. Pick one such agent, say
agent j, and the alternative, say b, which is top ranked by agent j.
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Consider R′ obtained from R via the following algorithm
Move a to the top position and b to the second position for all agents who
rank a in {1, 2, .., k∗(R)− 1}and b to the second position.
Move a to the top position and b to the second position for some agents
other than agent j who rank a k∗(R)th so that |{i ∈ N |r(a,R′i) = 1}| = dn2 e−1
. Keeping everything else fixed.
Now note that |{i ∈ N |r(b, R′i) ≤ 2}| = dn2 e and |{i ∈ N |r(a,R′i) ≤ 2}| <
dn
2
e . Thus a is not chosen at R′ even though R′ is a monotonic transformation
of R w.r.t. a, the desired contradiction.
Lemma 2. Let (a,R) ∈ GrM . M is locally monotonic at (a,R) only if one
of the following conditions hold
i) k∗(R) = 1.
ii)k∗(R) = 2 and a is the Condorcet winner at R.
Proof. k∗(R) = 1 case is obvious.
Assume k∗(R) = 2 and a is not the Condorcet winner at R. There exists
b ∈ A \ {a} s.t. |{i ∈ N |bRia}| ≥ dn2 e . Consider R′ obtained from R
by moving b to the top position in every such agents ranking ( i.e. the
agents who strictly prefer b to a), leaving everything else the same. Note that
k∗(R′) = 1 and a 6∈ M(R′) but R′ is a monotonic transformation of R w.r.t.
a. Completing the proof.
Remark 5. The preceding lemma also implies that for any preference profile
R and two distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A M cannot be locally monotonic
at both (a,R) and (b, R) except the case that [n is even, k∗(R) = 1 and
|{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) = 1}| = |{i ∈ N |r(b, Ri) = 1}| = n2 ]. It is a direct implication
of the fact that for all other cases we must have a and b to be the Condorcet
winner at R which is impossible.
Let R ∈ L(A)N , a ∈ A and b ∈ A\{a} .We will use the following notations
in the following proposition which characterizes local monotonicities of M .
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x = |{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) = 1}| (number of agents that top rank a )
y = |{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) = 2}| (number of agents that second rank a )
z = |{i ∈ N |bRia and r(a,Ri) = 2}| (number of agents who top rank
b and second rank a )
t = |{i ∈ N |bRia and r(a,Ri) < 2}| (number of agents who prefer b to
a and does not second rank a )
Proposition 10. Let (a,R) ∈ GrM . M is locally monotonic at (a,R) if and
only if one of the following conditions hold
i) k∗(R) = 1
ii) k∗(R) = 2 and for all b ∈ A \ {a}
z +min{y − z, dn
2
e − x− 1}+ t ≤ y.3
Proof. Assume M is locally monotonic at (a,R). By preceding lemmas
k∗(R) ≤ 2 and [k∗(R) = 1 and |{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) = 1}| ≥< n2 >] or [k∗(R) = 2
and a is the Condorcet winner at R].
If k∗(R) = 1 |{i ∈ N |r(a,Ri) = 1}| ≥< n2 > by preceding lemma.
If k∗(R) = 2 consider R′b obtained from R by the following changes:
Moving b to just below a for every agent who top ranks a,
Moving a to the top position and b to the second position in min{y −
z, dn
2
e − x − 1} agents preferences who initially second rank a and rank b
further below,
Moving b to the top position for any agent who prefers b to a and ranks
a below third position,
Keeping everything else fixed.
Clearly each R′b obtained is a monotonic transformation of R w.r.t. a and
k∗(R′b) = 2. Now M being locally monotonic at (a,R) implies a ∈ M(R′b)
which in turn gives z +min{y − z, dn
2
e − x− 1}+ t ≤ y.
To see the conserve, note that
3Note that z ≤ y by definition and x ≤ dn2 e − 1 when k∗(R) = 2.
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If k∗(R) = 1 and a is the Condorcet winner, |{i ∈ N |r(a,R′i) = 1}| ≥ l+1
for any monotonic transformation of R′ of R w.r.t. a, thus M(R′) = {a}.
If k∗(R) = 2 and for all b ∈ A\{a} z+min{y− z, dn
2
e−x−1}+ t ≤ y we
have x+ z +min{y − z, l − x}+ t ≤ x+ y which in turn implies a ∈M(R′)
for any monotonic transformation of R′ of R w.r.t. a by construction of R′b in
the preceding part. Because R′b is the most advantageous profile for b in the
sense that if b cannot prevent a from being chosen at R′b it cannot prevent
a from being chosen at any other monotonic transformation R′ of R w.r.t.
a.
Remark 6. The preceding proposition can be interpreted as follows:
If min{y − z, dn
2
e − x − 1} = dn
2
e − x − 1: z + y − z + t ≤ y ⇒ t = 0.
Intuitively, if x+(y−z) is less than the threshold dn
2
e−1 for some alternative
b, we must have t = 0,i.e. b cannot be ranked above a for any agents that
rank a strictly below second row.
If min{y − z, dn
2
e − x − 1} = dn
2
e − x − 1: z + dn
2
e − x − 1 + t ≤ y ⇒
dn
2
e − 1 ≥ (x + (y − z)) − t.Intuitively, if x + (y − z) is greater than the
threshold dn
2
e− 1 for some alternative b, (x+ (y− z))− t is also greater than
the threshold.
Example 2. The following example shows that M being locally monotonic at
(a,R) need not imply |M(R)| = 1 even if n is odd.
R1
1 2 3
a b c
b a d
c c a
d d b

Note that M is locally monotonic at (a,R1) but M(R1) = {a, b}.
Let (a,R) ∈ GrM and assume n is odd. The next example shows that
if k∗(R) = 2 even if a is the Condorcet winner at R , M may not be locally
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monotonic at (a,R).
R2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a b c d a a b
e e e e c d a
b a a a b c c
c c b b d b d
d d d c e e e

Note that M(R2) = {a, e} and a is the Condorcet winner at R2 but M is not
locally monotonic at (a,R2).
3.3 G-monotonicity
We will start by reminding some well-known definitions about implementation
theory.4
Let M =
∏
i∈N Mi denote a joint message space and C(M)
N denote the
set of complete preorders on M .
Given a joint message space M , o : M → A denotes an onto outcome
function and O denotes the set of all such functions. ∈ C(M)N is said to
be admissible if and only if, for any m,m′ ∈ M , [m ∼i m′ for some i ∈ N ]
implies [m ∼i m′for all i ∈ N ], i.e. indifference classes of each agent coincides.
Let A denote the set of all admissible profiles in C(M)N . Given an admis-
sible profile ∈ A ρ() denotes the partition of M into indifference classes
induced by .
For a given outcome function o ∈ O, p(o) = {g−1(a)|a ∈ A} ,i.e. the
partition of M induced by o. For any o ∈ O let A(o) = {∈ A|p(o) = ρ()}.
For any R ∈ L(A)N let R denote the complete pre-order on M induced by
R. And let U∗i (m,) denote the strict upper contour set of m w.r.t.  for
4Koray, Pasin (2005) introduce an elegant formulation which enables one to treat a
solution concept for normal form games as an SCR, we will borrow their formulation with
some minor changes.
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agent i; for any m ∈M , ∈ A and i ∈ N .
Remark 7. Each ∈ A leads to a unique linear order profile on A. Conversely
, R ∈ L(A)N leads to a unique complete pre-order profile ∈ A.
When we fix the player set N and the joint message space M =
∏
i∈N Mi
a solution concept for normal form games can be viewed as an SCR so that
the notions of g-monotonicity and self-g-monotonicity will apply to solution
concepts as well. A solution concept for normal form games with a joint
message space M , now becomes a mapping σ : C(M)N → 2M . In this setting
the joint strategy space is considered as the alternative set and the agent’s
rankings over the joint strategies as the preferences over the set of alternative
set. A solution concept assigns a subset of the joint message space to each
preference profile in the same way an SCR does. Let S denote the set of all
solution concepts and letGrσ = {(m,) ∈M×C(M)N |m ∈ σ()},i.e. graph
of σ. The notions of g-monotonicity and self-g-monotonicity now become
applicable to solution concepts for normal form games. g-monotonicity of a
solution concept will be denoted by G for convenience.
Now we are ready to give the definition of self −G−monotonicity of a
solution concept relative to a mechanism.
Definition. Let µ = (M, o) be a mechanism with joint message space M and
outcome function o. Let σ be a solution concept and let G : Grσ → (2M)N .
G is said to be a G-monotonicity for σ relative to µ if and only if
For all , ′ ∈ A(o) and for all m ∈ σ()
[∀i ∈ N Li(m,) ∪Gi(m,) ⊂ Li(m,′)]⇒ ∃m′ ∈ σ(′) : m′ ∼ m.
Minimal G-monotonicities for σ relative to µ are called self-G-monotonicities
for σ relative to µ.
The following proposition summarizes the inheritance of monotonicity
properties from solution concepts to SCRs they implement via a pre-specified
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mechanism.
Proposition 11. Let σ be a solution concept. Given F : L(A)N → A an SCR
which is σ-implementable and µ = (M, o) a mechanism that σ implements
F . Let G : Grσ → (2M)N be a G-monotonicity of σ relative to µ. Now
gµi : GrF → (2A)N defined as follows is a g-monotonicity of F :
for any preference profile R ∈ L(A)N , any a ∈ F (R) , any joint message
m ∈ σ(R) s.t. a ∈ o(m) and any agent i ∈ N
gµi (a,R) = {o(m′)|m′ ∈ Gi(m,R)}. 5
Proof. Let (a,R) ∈ GrF and R′ ∈ L(A)N s.t.
Li(a,R) ∪ gµi (a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′) ∀i ∈ N
(a,R) ∈ GrF implies there exists m ∈ M s.t. a ∈ o(m). Now by the
above inclusions and definition of gµ
Li(m,R) ∪Gi(m,R) ⊂ Li(m,′R)
and since σ is G−monotonic via µ this implies there exists m′ ∈ σ(′R) s.t.
m′ ∼R′ m. Note that R ∈ L(A)N thus m′ ∼R′ m implies a ∈ o(m′), i.e.
a ∈ F (R′).
Kaya and Koray (2000) introduce the notion of universal monotonicity for
solution concepts. We will mention some of their results before we proceed.6
First set A(O′) =
⋃
o∈O′ A(o) for any nonempty subset O′ of O. Now,
given a solution concept σ and a nonempty subset O′ of O, we say that
O′ −monotonic if and only if, for any ,′∈ A(O′) with ρ() = ρ(′) and
m ∈ σ() there exists some m′ ∈ σ(′) with m′ ∼ m whenever Li(m,
5Existence of m is guaranteed by F being σ-implementable via µ = (M, o).
6They also fix the joint message space so each outcome function defines a mechanism.
For a more detailed discussion of universal monotonicity interested reader is referred to
Kaya and Koray (2000).
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) ⊂ Li(m,′) for any i ∈ N . We refer to O − monotonicity as universal
monotonicity.
We now associate a class Oσ of outcome functions with each solution
concept σ through Oσ = {o ∈ O| |o(σ())| = 1 for each ∈ A(o)}. Given
σ, this is the class of all outcome functions via which σ only implements
singleton valued SCRs.7
Remark 8. A solution concept σ is universally monotonic [Oσ −monotonic]
if and only if it is G∅ monotonic , where G∅ is a G-monotonicity function
assigning emptyset for any agent, message, preference relation triple and for
any outcome function o ∈ O [o ∈ Oσ].
Remark 9. “Maskin monotonicity” is nothing but strongest form of G -
monotonicity, thus G-monotonicity notion does not give any information
when working with universally monotonic solution concepts. This relation
is direct consequence of Maskin monotonicity , g-monotonicity relation.
Kaya and Koray note that Nash and strong Nash solution concepts are
universally monotonic thus they implement only Maskin monotonic SCRs.
The following lemma summarizes their results on undominated strategies so-
lution concept and undominated Nash solution concept respectively.
Lemma 3. 1) Let σ stand for the undominated strategies solution concept.
Let O∗σ = {o ∈ Oσ|(M, o) is a bounded mechanism }.8 Then, σ is O∗σ mono-
tonic. σ is not Oσ −monotonic ( thus not universally monotonic).
2) Undominated Nash equilibrium solution concept is not universally mono-
tonic, nor Oσ-monotonic where σ stand for the undominated Nash equilibrium
solution concept.
7Kaya and Koray characterize solution concepts which only implement maskin mono-
tonic SCRs as universally monotonic solution concepts. They also characterize solution
concepts which only implement dictatorial social choice functions as Oσ −monotonic so-
lution concepts when |A| ≥ 3.
8A mechanism (M,o) is bounded if and only if ∀i ∈ N ,  inC(M)N , mi ∈ Mi: mi
is either undominated or ∃mi ∈ Mi which dominates mi and is undominated. Note that
(M,o) is whenever M is finite.
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In light of the preceding remark G −monotonicity notion is only useful
for further classifying monotonicity properties of non universally monotonic
SCRs. By previous lemma both undominated strategies solution concept and
undominated Nash equilibrium solution concept are non universally mono-
tonic. We also characterized G − monotonicity of Majoritarian Compro-
mise, a non Maskin monotonic subgame perfect implementable SCR, so it is
worthwhile to search for a way to define G−monotonicity for extensive form
mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS WITH
BIPOLAR PREFERENCE PROFILES
Given a subset, D, of L(A), an SCF F : DN → A is dictatorial if there exists
a unique i ∈ N such that ∀R ∈ DN
F (R) = {a ∈ A|∀b ∈ A; aRib}
Given two preferences Ri, R
′
i ∈ L(A) the Manhattan distance between Ri
and R′i is defined as follows
1;
m(Ri, R
′
i) =
∑
a∈A
|r(a,Ri)− r(a,R′i)|
2
Let
P 1
a1
. . .
am
and
P 2
am
. . .
a1
; r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m(m−1)
2
}, define
1Koray,Kavlakoglu,Gurer(2008) contains a more detailed treatment of Manhattan met-
ric.
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Dr1,r2(P
1, P 2) = Dr1(P
1)
⋃
Dr2(P
2) where
Dr1(P
1) = {Pi ∈ L(A)|m(P 1, Pi) ≤ r1}
Dr2(P
2) = {Pi ∈ L(A)|m(P 2, Pi) ≤ r2}
without loss of generality we will assume r1 ≥ r2 through this section.
Definition. A domain D ∈ L(A) satisfies unique seconds property if there
exists a, b ∈ A s.t. for all Ri ∈ D.
r(a,Ri) = 1⇒ r(a,Ri) = 0
The following simple lemma will be helpful in construction of the
nondictatorial SCF in the following theorem.
Lemma 4. For 0 ≤ r1 +r2 ≤ m−2 Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) satisfies unique seconds
property.
Proof. Let a = ar1+1 and b = a1 in the definition of unique seconds property.
Note that r1 < m − r2 so there does not exist Pi in Dr2(P 2) with r1(Pi) =
ar1+1. Thus Pi ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) and r1(Pi) = ar1+1 implies Pi ∈ Dr1(P 1)
and it takes r1 elementary transformations to take ar1+1 to the top position
starting from P 1, so for any such Pi r2(Pi) = a1
Theorem 2. For 0 ≤ r1+r2 ≤ m−2 Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) is a possibility domain.
Proof. Case 1: r1 + r2 = 0 In this trivial case Dr1,r2(P
1, P 2) = {P 1, P 2}.
Define F : Dr1,r2(P
1, P 2)
N → A as follows: ∀R ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N
F (R) =
 am, if P1 = P
2 and ∃j 6= 1 with Pj = P 2;
a1, otherwise.
Nondictoriality, unanimity and also Maskin monotonicity of F defined as
above are easy to check.
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Case 2: 0 < r1 + r2 ≤ m− 2 Define F : Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N → A as follows:
∀R ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N
F (R) =

σ(1, 1, R), if σ(1, 1, R) 6= ar1+1;
ar1+1, if σ(1, 1, R) = ar1+1 and ar1+1R2a1;
a1, σ(1, 1, R) = ar1+1 and a1R2ar1+1.
Clearly F is unanimous.
F is non-dictatorial since : R∗ =

ar1+1 a1 . . . a1
a1 . . .
. . . .
am am . am

∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N
and F (R∗) = a1 6= ar1+1. (the fact that other agents cannot be dictator is
easy to see)
F is Maskin monotonic :
If F (R) = σ(1, 1, R) 6= ar1+1 ∀R′ ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N s.t.
R′ ∈MT (σ(1, 1, R), R) , σ(1, 1, P ′) 6= σ(1, 1, R), thus F (R′) = σ(1, 1, R)
If F (R) = ar1+1 then σ(1, 1, R) = ar1+1 and ar1+1P2a1, clearly for any
R′ ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N , r1(P1) s.t R′ ∈ MT (ar1+1, R), σ(1, 1, R′) = σ(1, 1, R)
and ar1+1R
′
2a1, thus F (R
′) = ar1+1.
If F (R) = a1 where σ(1, 1, R) = ar1+1 and a1R2ar1+1, by preceding
Lemma σ(1, 2, R) = a1. For any P
′ ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)N , a1) s.t. R′ ∈MT (a1, R),
[a1 is at top of R
′
1] or [ar1+1 is at the top of R
′
1 and a1 is in the second place].
(thinking of preferences as column vectors ).
If r1(R
′
1) = a1 F (R
′) = a1 and if [ar1+1 is at the top of R′1 and a1 is in
the second place] a1R2ar1+1 implies a1R
′
2ar1+1 F (R
′) = a1 by definition of F
.
Theorem 3. For r1 + r2 = m− 1, Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) is an impossibility domain.
Proof. To simplify notation we will write D instead of Dr1,r2(P
1, P 2) through-
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out this proof ; let F : DN → A be a M.M. and unanimous SCF , k ∈
{1, . . . , r1} and define P k and Bk as follows:
T k =
ak
a1
a2
. . .
am
Bk =
a1
a2
. . .
ak+r1−1
ak
. . .
am
Consider P k = [T k . . . T k] ∈ DN ; by unanimity, F (P k) = ak.
Now starting from P k, column by column, take ak as down as possible so
that ak is still chosen and the new profile is in the domain, keeping all the
other orderings the same. Let the final ordering be P ′k; at least one column
of P ′k must be T k, otherwise a1 would be chosen by unanimity. Now take
any i ∈ N s.t. P ′i k 6= T k and P ′i k 6= Bk, if such i exists. Let am be just
below ak in P
′
i
k. Since P ′i
k 6= Bk, by switching am and ak in P ′i k, the new
profile, say P ′′i
k ∈ D. It is also clear that T ′k =
a1
ak
a2
. . .
am
∈ D then consider
P ′′k = [...Pj−1′k P ′k Pj+1′k...Pi−1′k P ′′i
k Pi+1
′k...] in DN .
By construction of P k, F (P ′′k) 6= ak; by M.M. F (P ′′k) should be both a1 and
am contradiction.
Therefore, for any i ∈ N ; P ′ki = T k or Bk; w.l.o.g. let P ′k1 , ..., P ′kl = T k and
P ′kl+1, ..., P
′k
N = B
k.
l ≥ 1 is allready proven, assume to the contrary that l ≥ 2 :
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Let T ′′k =
a2
ak
a1
a3
...
am
and for j ∈ {1, .., l} P ′k,j = [P ′k1 P ′k2 ...P ′kj−1 T ′′k P ′kl+1...P ′kN ]
We will preove by induction F (P ′k,2) = ak:
Initial step is F (P ′k,l) = ak. By M.M. F (P ′
k,l) = a2 or ak.
Note that
ak
a2
a1
a3
...
am
∈ D and consider first three rows of l − 1 and lth columns of
P ′k,l (considered as a m× n matrix); keeping other rankings fixed:
ak ak
a1 a1
a2 a2
−→F ak ⇒
ak ak
a1 a2
a2 a1
−→F ak ⇒
a1 ak
ak a2
a2 a1
−→F ak or a1
If
a1 ak
ak a2
a2 a1
−→F ak quad then
a1 ak
ak a1
a2 a2
−→F ak which is a contradiction
with definition of P ′k.
Hence
a1 ak
ak a2
a2 a1
−→F a1 ⇒
a1 a2
ak ak
a2 a1
−→F a1 ⇒
ak a2
a1 ak
a2 a1
−→F a1 or ak
But we also have that
ak ak
a1 a1
a2 a2
−→F ak ⇒
ak a2
a1 ak
a2 a1
−→F a2 or ak
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Therefore
ak a2
a1 ak
a2 a1
−→F ak , i.e. F (P ′k,l) = ak.
To show F (P ′k,l−1) = ak we use F (P ′
k,l) = ak and the same methodology,
applying this method l − j + 1 times, we get F (P ′k,2) = ak as claimed.
To see F (P ′k,1) = a2 note that F (P ′
k) = ak implies F (P
′k ...P ′k P ′′k...P ′′k) =
ak ⇒ F (P ′k) = ak or a2 on the other hand
let P ′′′ =
a2
a1
...
∈ D, F (P ′′′N) = a2 ⇒M.M. F (P ′k,1) = a2 or a1 thus
F (P ′k,1) = a2
Now consider the first two columns and three rows of P ′k,2
ak a2
a1 ak
a2 a1
−→F ak and
a2 a2
ak ak
a1 a1
−→F a2 .
ak a2
a1 ak
a2 a1
−→F ak ⇒
ak a2
a2 ak
a1 a1
−→F ak ⇒
ak a2
a2 a1
a1 ak
−→F ak or a1; but it
cannot be ak by definition of P
′k.
Now
ak a2
a2 a1
a1 ak
−→F a1 ⇒
a2 a2
ak a1
a1 ak
−→F a1
however
a2 a2
ak ak
a1 a1
−→F a2 ⇒
a2 a2
ak a1
a1 ak
−→F a2
the desired contradiction, thus l = 1,i.e. ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., r1} ∃ik ∈ N with
F (P k) = ak where
P kik = T
k and P kj = B
k ∀j 6= ik.
For k ∈ {m − r2 + 1, ...,m} same proof applies replacing a1 with am; a2
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with am−1 . T k , Bk in that case respectively are:
ak
am
am−1
...
a1
and
am
am−1
...
ak
...
a1
ak is
in m− k + 1th place in Bk.
For k = r1 + 1 = n − r2; first note that P 1 =
ak
a1
...
am
, P 2 =
a1
...
am
ak
, P 3 =
a1
...
ak
am
,
P 4 =
ak
am
...
a1
, P 5 =
am
...
a1
ak
, P 6 =
am
...
...
a1
∈ D.
We have shown that ∃i1 ∈ N s. t. whenever i1 top ranks a1, a1 gets chosen
under F ; w.l.o.g. let i1 = 1.
Consider P =
a1 am ... ... am
ak ... ... ... ...
... a1 ... ... a1
am ak ... ... ak
; F (P ) = a1 by agent 1 being the dicta-
tor for alternative a1, furthermore it is easy to see that dictator for alternative
am (cause all the other agents top rank am and still am is not chosen); these
two together gives agent 1 is dictator for aj for all j ∈ {1, ..., r1,m − r2 +
1, ...,m}.
Only thing remaining to show is agent 1 is dictator for ar1+1,let k = r
1 +1
this time and assume to the contrary that ∃P ∗ ∈ D s.t. r1(P ∗1 ) = ak but
F (P ∗) 6= ak
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Consider P ′ =
ak am ...
a1 ... ...
a2 ... ...
... a1 ...
am ak ...
∈ D F (P ′) 6= ak otherwise it would imply
F (P ∗) 6= ak.
Passing from P to P ′ by M.M. F (P ′) = ak or a1, so F (P ′) = a1. Obtain P ′′
form P ′ by moving ak just above a1 in all the agents preferences except agent
1 and keep agent 1’s preference the same; F (P ′′) = ak or a1.
Assume to the contrary that F (P ′′) = ak and define P ′′′ as follows P ′′′1 =
ak
am
...
a1
and P ′′′i = P
′′
i for i 6= 1
F (P ′′) = ak ⇒ F (P ′′′) = ak
Let P ′′′′ =
ak am ... am
am ... ... ...
... a1 ... a1
a1 ak ... ak
F (P ′′′′) = a1 or ak by M.M.; neither is possible since: F (P ′′′′) = a1 ⇒
F (P 5....P 5) = a1 contradicting unanimity
F (P ′′′′) = ak ⇒ F (P ′) = ak 6= a1 contradiction.
Thus agent 1 is dictator for ar1+1 as well, implying F is dictatorial , i.e. D is
an impossibility domain.
Definition. A domain D is top − bottom rich iff ∀a ∈ A ∃P, P ′ ∈ D
with
r(a, P ) = 1 and r(a, P ′) = m
Lemma 5. For r1 + r2 = m− 1 Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) is top− bottom rich.
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Proof. Pick ai ∈ A
If i ≤ r1 + 1 ∃P i ∈ Dr1(P 1) with r1(P i) = ai and if i ≥ m− r2 ∃P i ∈
Dr2(P
2) r2(P
i) = ai, noting r
1 + r2 = m − 1 implies r1 = m − r2, we
get ∃P i ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2) with r1(P i) = ai ∀ai ∈ A .
Similarly if i ≥ m− r2 ∃P i ∈ Dr2(P 2) with rm(P i) = ai and if i ≤ r1 + 1
∃P i ∈ Dr1(P 1) with rm(P i) = ai, we get ∀ai ∈ A ∃P i ∈ Dr1,r2(P 1, P 2)
with rm(P
i) = ai ∀ai ∈ A .
Lemma 6. Let D ⊂ L(A) be a top−bottom rich domain and D ⊂ K ⊂ L(A).
If DN is a domain of impossibility then so also is KN .
Proof. Let F : KN → A be a Maskin monotonic and unanimous SCF. Then
restriction of F to DN , F |DN , is still M.M. and unanimous; hence F |DN is
dictatorial, w.l.o.g. let 1st agent be the dictator. Given a ∈ A, let P, P ′ ∈ D
s.t. r1(P ) = rm(P
′) = a. F (P, P ′, ..., P ′) = a and when we pass to any profile
S ∈ KN with r1(S1) = a, clearly S is a improvement for alternative a, thus
F (S) = a.
The following corollary summarizes our results on “bipolar” societies :
Corollary. Dr1,r2(P
1, P 2) ∈ L(A) is an impossibility domain if and only if
r1 + r2 ≥ m− 1.
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CHAPTER 5
INDIFFERENCES AND DICTATORIALITY
The following simple proposition points out that Maskin monotonicity is
too demanding on C(A)N because it turns out that only Maskin monotonic
SCFs defined on C(A)N are the family of constant SCFs.
Proposition 12. Let F : C(A)N → A be an SCF. F satisfies Maskin
monotonicity only if F is constant.
Proof. Assume F is not constant , i.e. there exists a, b ∈ A a 6= b and
R,R′ ∈ C(A)N s.t. F (R) = a and F (R′) = b. Consider the preference profile
R′′ ∈ C(A)N s.t. a and b are both top ranked in any agents preference,i.e.
∀i ∈ N ∀c ∈ A aRic and aRic. Maskin monotonicity implies a, b ∈ F (R′′)
which contradicts with F being an SCF since a 6= b.
The following definition of monotonicity requires preservation both lower
counter sets and strictly lower counter sets for all agents in order to guarantee
that the chosen alternative does not change.
Given an alternative a ∈ A and a preference profile R ∈ C(A)N , let
MT ∗(a,R) = {R′ ∈ C(A)N | Li(a,R) ⊆ L(a,R′i) and L∗i (a,R) ⊆ L∗i (a,R′)}.
Definition. An SCF F : C(A)N → A satisfies monotonicity if and only if
∀ R,R′ ∈ C(A), ∀i ∈ N
F (R) = a, R′ ∈MT ∗(a,R) implies F (R′) = a.
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Note that monotonicity is equivalent to M.M. when indifferences are not
allowed.
Definition. An SCF F : C(A)N → A satisfies weak dictatoriality if and
only if
∃i ∈ N s.t. ∀R ∈ C(A)N F (R) ∈ I1(Ri)
where I1(Ri) denotes the top indifference class of agent i.
Weak dictatoriality only requires that at each preference profile the cho-
sen alternative must be from the top indifference class of the dictator. If we
also add the requirement that the choice at any profile only depends on the
preference of the dictator we get the following definition.
Definition. An SCF F : C(A)N → A satisfies dictatoriality iff F satisfies
weak dictatoriality ( say agent i is the dictator) and ∀R,R′ ∈ C(A)N
Ri = R
′
i ⇒ F (R) = F (R′)
Given an alternative a ∈ A, a preference profile R ∈ C(A)N we will
denote the top indefferece class of agent i at preference profile R by I1(Ri),i.e.
I1(Ri) = {a ∈ A|aRib∀b ∈ A}
On top of requirements of dictatoriality adding the intuitive condition
that when the dictator has a finer top indifference class ,containing the pre-
viously chosen alternative , say a, a is still chosen, we get the strongest
dictatoriality that we will consider.
Definition. An SCF F : C(A)N → A satisfies strict dictatoriality iff F
satisfies dictatoriality ( say agent i is the dictator) and ∀R,R′ ∈ C(A)N
F (R) = a and a ∈ I1(R′i) ⊆ I1(Ri) ⇒ F (R) = F (R′)
Theorem 4. Let F : C(A)N → A be a monotonic and unanmious SCF,
then F satisfies weak dictatoriality.
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Proof. Let F be a monotonic and unanimous SCF. Note that F restricted
to L(A)N is Maskin monotonic and unanimous thus there exists an unique
agent i ∈ N s.t. ∀R ∈ L(A)N , F (R) is the top ranked alternative in Ri by
the well known Mueller-Satthertwaite Theorem. Without loss of generality
assume agent 1 is the dictator.
Assume to the contrary that F is not weakly − dictatorial, i.e. ∃R ∈
C(A)N s.t. F (R) /∈ I1(R1): Let R =
{x, y, z} ... ... ...
. . . ... ... ...
{w, ...} ... ... ...
. . . ... ... ...
and F (R) = w. Obtain the preference profile R′ from R by breaking indiffer-
ence classes which does not contain w, for all agents. Note that F (R′) = w
by monotonicity.
Now consider R′′ ∈ L(A)N s.t. x is top ranked in agent 1’s preference and
for all other agents x is bottom ranked . Note that F (R′′) = x and passing
from R′′ to R′ monotonicity implies F (R′) = x 6= w, the desired contradiction.
The following example shows that monotonicity and unanimity does not
imply dictatoriality (thus str. dictatoriality )
Example 3. Let A = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2} . Define F : C(A)N → A
as follows: F is a weak-dictatorial function of agent 1 and for ∀R ∈ C(A)N
s.t. I1(R1) = {a, b} if bP2a F (R) = b and F (R) = a if aP2b. For any other
preference profile define F suitably. Note that F satisfies monotonicity and
unanimity but it is not dictatorial.
Following example shows that dictatoriality (thus weak dictatoriality )
does not imply monotonicity.
Example 4. Let A = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2, 3} .Define F : C(A)N → A as
follows: F is a dictatorial function of agent 1 and ∀R ∈ C(A)N ; F (R) = a if
I1(R1) = {a, b} or I1(R1) = {a, c} , F (R) = c if I1(R1) = {b, c} and F (R) = b
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if I1(R1) = {a, b, c}. Note that passing from a preference profile where agent
1 ranks b and c as the most desirable alternatives to a preference profile where
agent 1 is indifferent between a,b and c monotonicity implies c continues to
get chosen , thus F does not satisfy monotonicity.
Definition. Let F : C(A)N → A be an SCF. We say that F is tie− breaker
iff ∃P ∈ L(A) s.t. ∀R ∈ C(A)N
F (R) = F (RP )
where RP ∈ L(A)N is the preference profile obtained from R by breaking
all the indifferences according to P .
The following simple lemma will be useful in characterization of str.
dictatorial SCFs.
Lemma 7. Any str. dictatorial SCF is a tie− breaker.
Proof. Let F : C(A)N → A be a str. dictatorial SCF. Without loss of gen-
erality assume agent 1 is the dictator. Let R1, R2, ..., Rm ∈ C(A)N be pref-
erence profiles s.t. I1(R
1
1) = A, I1(R
2
1) = I1(R
1
1) \ F (R1), ... ,I1(Rm1 ) =
I1(R
m−1
1 ) \ F (Rm−1).
Claim: F is a tie− breaker with P = (F (R1), F (R2), ..., F (Rm) ∈ L(A) .
Proof of The Claim:Assume it is not the case and there exists R ∈ C(A)N
s.t. a = F (R) 6= F (RP ) = b . Let b = F (Rk) for some k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} , note
that F (RP ) = F (Rk) implies I1(R1) ⊂ I1(Rk1). Now passing from Rk to R ,
we get F (Rk) = F (R) the desired contradiction.
Theorem 5. An SCF F : C(A)N → A is monotonic, unanimous and tie−
breaker iff F is strictly dictatorial.
Proof. Assume F is strictly dictatorial and w.l.o.g. assume agent 1 is the
dictator. Let R,R′ ∈ C(A)N s.t. F (R) = a, R′ ∈ MT ∗(a,R). F (R) = a
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implies a ∈ I1(R1) and R′ ∈ MT ∗(a,R) implies I1(R1) ⊂ I1(R′1) and a ∈
I1(R
′
1). Now F (R
′) = a since F is a strictly dictatorial SCF with agent 1 as
the dictator. Thus F satisfies monotonicity.
By the previous lemma F is tie− breaker and unanimity of F is obvious.
Assume F is monotonic, unanimous and tie− breaker.
Unanimity and monotonicity together imply F is a weak − dictatorial.
W.l.o.g. assume agent 1 is the dictator and let P ∈ L(A)N be the preference
according to which F is a tie− breaker.
Let R,R′ ∈ C(A)N s.t. R1 = R2 , now RP1 = R′P1 , F (R) = RP and
F (R′) = R′P implies F (R) = F (R′) by weak − dictatoriality of F . Thus F
is dictatorial.
Let R,R′ ∈ C(A)N s.t. F (R) = a and a ∈ I1(R′i) ⊆ I1(Ri) . Note that
F (R) = a implies F (Rp) = a. Now F (Rp) = a and a ∈ I1(R′i) ⊆ I1(Ri) gives
F (R′p) = a, thus F is strictly − dictatorial.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Concerning monotonicity properties of non Maskin monotonic SCRs, we de-
fined notions of g−monotonicity and monotonicity region. Although we did
not have enough time to reach the results we aimed for in this chapter concern-
ing implementability, the results are still promising. We investigated mono-
tonicity properties of standard scoring rules and gave a comparison of scoring
rules in terms of monotonicities they satisfy. We also characterized local
monotonicity properties of Majoritarian Compromise SCR. We showed that
Majoritarian Compromise SCR’s local monotonicity properties are closely re-
lated to generalized Condorcet type conditions. In the final section of this
chapter we show that g −monotonicity of an SCR is inherited from solution
concept which implements it ,via the mechanisms implementation takes place.
We did not have enough time to reach characterization results in implemen-
tation that we aimed for, but we strongly believe that G − monotonicity (
coupled with some other monotonicity notion ) is promising in characteri-
zation of self-monotonicities of non universally monotonic solution concepts.
So, we are planning to focus our future research on that subject.
In chapter 4, we show that a “bipolar” domain D, is a domain of impos-
sibility if and only if sum of the two radiuses is greater or equal to |A| − 1.
This result was conjectured by Koray,S., Kavlakoglu,S., Gurer,E.,(2008) in
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their conclusion. The proof given, although a bit long, mostly depends on
the careful use of critical profiles (w.r.t. a restricted domain) and ones again
shows usefulness of critical profiles notion while working with Maskin mono-
tonic SCRs. The results in this part can be generalized in two ways. Firstly
considering polarized societies instead of bipolar ones may result in a better
understanding of historically standard preference domains in a more gener-
alized fashion. Secondly following the idea of Erol (2009), instead of using
Manhattan metric; defining some other metrics and working with domains
clustered according to them will be useful generalizations of our results.
Finally, in the last chapter concerning the impossibility on C(A)N ; we
show that Maskin monotonicity is too demanding when we restrict our at-
tention to SCFs. We give a natural extension of Maskin monotonicity, define
three kinds of dictatorialities and investigate the relation between our mono-
tonicity definition and these dictatorilaties. We give a characterization of
strictly dictatorial SCFs as the SCFs satisfying unanimity, monotonicity
and tie− breaking. Our results in this section strengthen the warning for the
researchers planning to work on complete pre-orders that indifferences may
change the results dramatically.
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